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 Foreword
As the financial year draws to a close, it is a good 
time to reflect on Scotlands economic performance 
over the past twelve months and perhaps more 
so, to consider the significant challenges that lie 
ahead. 
Little has changed since Decembers Fraser 
Economic Commentary on Scotlands economic 
performance; there is growth, but the pace is slow 
with little expectation it will accelerate at any 
significant rate over the coming three years. As has 
been well established, increasing productivity has 
been, and remains, one of Scotlands key economic 
challenges.  
As a relatively small and open economy, we must 
continue to strive to be agile and adaptable if 
we are to improve on our growth rate. We should 
seek to react positively and assertively to both the 
internal and external influences that shape our 
economy and look to seize new opportunities as 
they present themselves.
The biggest and most complicated challenge we 
face in the immediate term is Brexit. The 21 month 
status quo transition period, whilst a welcome 
development for business, is still dependent on 
agreement being reached on the UKs withdrawal. 
This is not guaranteed  with a resolution still 
needed on the Irish border and definition on 
the role of the EU courts. Given the scale and 
complexity of some of the business issues related 
to Brexit, it would be prudent for those businesses 
which have started to continue with their Brexit 
planning and for those who have not, to start now. 
This should help to ensure they are prepared for a 
range of potential outcomes. Time is short. 
The final framework for Brexit has the potential 
to have a profound impact on many of Scotlands 
industries and sectors, and that impact should 
not be underestimated. In a year, we will leave the 
European Union and, on the current timetable, at 
the end of December 2020 we will be out of the 
transition period. As an illustration of the changes 
to come, EU Free Trade Agreements with as many 
as 50 countries from which we currently benefit, 
will no longer be available. At this stage we do not 
know what they will be replaced by or when.  
Scotland has a robust economy and this is a 
challenge we can rise to under the right business 
environment and with the right mind-set. There are 
a range of steps businesses can take to prepare 
for Brexit effectively so they are well positioned 
to respond whatever the outcome. There will be 
opportunities and businesses need to be ready to 
seize them.
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
 March 2018
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The Scottish economy continues to grow, but it 
does so at a slow pace. 
Indeed, output per head in Scotland is now smaller 
than it was back at the start of 2015. 
The key explanation for this had been the downturn 
in the oil and gas sector. But in recent months, 
there are signs that activity in the North Sea  and 
its supply chain  has been recovering.  
Instead, it has been sluggish growth in services 
and a sharp decline in construction output that has 
acted as the brake on Scotlands economy.  
Looking ahead, most indicators of business 
sentiment and consumer confidence suggest little 
possibility of a strong bounce-back in economic 
prospects in the near-term. 
Despite this backdrop, employment and 
unemployment continue to perform much better 
than expectations. But as a result, productivity 
continues to be squeezed. Output per hour worked 
is now back at 2010 levels. 
The global economy should provide a boost to 
growth prospects in 2018, with most of Scotlands 
major trading partners expected to have a strong 
year. Recent data suggests that Scottish exports 
have grown relatively strongly in 2017.
All things considered, our forecasts remain broadly 
the same as they were in December, with output 
expected to pick up this year and next. 
Brexit remains the biggest challenge on the horizon. 
As we have argued on a number of occasions, 
we believe that the decision to leave the EU will 
damage Scotlands long-term growth prospects.  
But like it or not, Brexit is happening. 
Summary
Whilst it will be some time yet before we know 
the exact details of the UKs future economic 
relationship with the EU, this cannot be used 
as justification not to undertake appropriate 
preparatory and planning work. 
Scotland has a strong and prosperous economy 
and this will continue no matter the constitutional 
structure. So businesses need to work now, not 
just on their vulnerabilities to different Brexit 
outcomes, but to seek new opportunities both at 
home and abroad. 
There is arguably much more that both the Scottish 
and UK Governments could do to help businesses 
prepare for Brexit. Providing this support should 
not be viewed as inconsistent with Ministers 
different political standpoints. 
Finally, we argue that the scale of the challenge 
presented by Brexit  coupled with wider structural 
changes in our economy such as technological 
and demographic change  means that effective 
economic policymaking is more important than 
ever.  
In 2007, the Scottish Government set out a new 
approach to policy centred upon a single economic 
strategy upon which all public sector initiatives 
were to align behind. 
But over the past decade, this clarity of focus and 
delivery has arguably been lost, with a myriad of 
different strategies, advisory groups and bodies 
now cluttering the landscape. 
With Brexit likely to test the resilience of the 
economy, rediscovering a single unified vision for 
economic policy might just be the most significant 
 and effective  step the Scottish Government 
could take in 2018.
Fraser of Allander Institute 
March 2018
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At a glance
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.9
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.6
Services 1.1 1.3 1.4
Table: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2018  2020
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Outlook and Appraisal 
The latest data on Scotlands economic performance continue to paint a weak picture, with growth 
still lagging behind the UK as a whole. But unpicking the data, we see that  with the exception of the 
construction sector  growth is actually stronger in many key sectors than the headline figures suggest. 
We predict that growth will pick-up in 2018 and 2019. However, Brexit continues to dominate the medium 
term outlook. In such times, a clarity of purpose and alignment in the policy process is crucial.
Introduction 
The latest data continues to show that whilst the 
Scottish economy is growing, it continues to do so 
at a relatively slow pace.  
On an annual basis, growth of 0.6% is well below 
both Scotlands long-term trend and the 1.7% rate 
of growth in the UK as a whole. (Table 1) 
As Chart 1 highlights, the Scottish economy has 
been in a cycle of low growth for over two years 
now. Indeed, GDP per head is now lower than it 
was back in Q1 2015. 
As we discuss in the report, it is increasingly clear 
that the downturn in oil and gas is not the only 
reason for this weak performance. 
More recent indicators  including surveys and 
our own nowcasts  suggest that business activity 
continues to pick up. But expectations for future 
growth remain weak.
Despite this, unemployment fell by 9,000 over 
the year. That being said, there are signs of some 
weakening with employment falling by 8,000 over 
the 3-months to Feb 2018. (Table 2)
On the one hand, the increasing strength of the 
global economy should offer a boost to growth 
over this year and next. But on the other, Brexit 
continues to cast a shadow over the outlook. 
It is vitally important that businesses and 
policymakers prepare for Brexit, and for all possible 
outcomes of the negotiations. 
Chart 1: Scottish growth (since 2013)  year and quarter
Source: Scottish Government
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Table 1: Scottish growth (%) by sector, Q3 2017
Source: Scottish Government
GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services
Q3 0.2 0.7 1.2 -2.9 0.2
UK 0.4 0.8 1.3 -0.5 0.4
Annual 0.6 1.2 2.6 -7.5 0.9
UK 1.7 0.6 2.4 4.8 1.4
Table 2: Labour market headline statistics, change on same 
quarter year before, November 2017  January 2018
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 78.1% Ÿ 4.3% ź
England 79.2% Ÿ 4.3% ź
Wales 76.4% ź 4.8% ź
N. Ireland 72.2% Ÿ 3.2% Ÿ
UK 75.3% Ÿ 4.3% ź
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The global economy 
Global economic activity remains relatively 
buoyant. 
World economic output is estimated to have grown 
by 3.7% in 2017  half a percentage point higher 
than in 2016. 
The IMF estimate that some 120 economies, 
accounting for 3/4 of world GDP, have seen an 
increase in growth in 2017. This is the most 
synchronised upswing since 2010.
Recent indicators point to this expansion continuing 
into 2018 and 2019  albeit perhaps not at the 
same (above trend) rate.  (Table 3)
The US economy continues to perform strongly, 
supported by recent tax reforms.  
And as discussed in Decembers Commentary, one 
particular bright spot has been the turnaround in 
the European economy over the past year. 
Expected Euro Area growth in 2017 of 2.4% is the 
fastest since 2010 and employment is now back 
above its pre-crisis level.  
Confidence is improving across all sectors of the 
European economy. (Chart 2)
Despite this positive outlook, global stock markets 
have been volatile. Following a year of gains, 
early February saw a sharp sell-off in assets. For 
example, the Dow Jones fell 10%. (Chart 3) 
So far however, this appears to be a short-term 
market correction rather than a sustained 
deterioration in sentiment. 
That being said, risks are not difficult to identify. 
Weak productivity growth is a challenge for 
many countries. And policy uncertainty remains 
heightened. 
The decision by the Trump administration to impose 
tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminium has 
fuelled fears of a rise in protectionist sentiment 
across the world.  
Whilst talk of a trade war  most notably between 
the USA and China  is premature, future multi or 
bilateral trade deals (for any country) look less 
likely.
Table 3: OECD forecasts for G7 growth to 2019
Source: OECD
2017 2018 2019
UK 1.7* 1.2 1.1
US 2.2 2.5 2.1
Japan 1.5 1.2 1.0
Canada 3.0 2.1 1.9
Euro Area 2.4 2.2 1.9
Germany 2.5 2.3 1.9
France 1.8 1.8 1.7
Italy 1.6 1.5 1.3
Chart 2: Market confidence in EU  highest since Euro crisis
Source: European Commission
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The latest official export figures for Scotland were 
published in January. 
Scotlands international exports amounted to 
around £29.8 billion in 2016. Exports to the rest of 
the UK were nearly £45.8 billion. 
The latest figures show a fall in Scottish exports of 
£3.9 billion between 2015 and 2016  driven by a 
sharp decline in rUK exports. (Chart 4)
Whilst Scotland has key strengths in many areas, it 
is widely accepted that there is a need to develop a 
stronger and more diverse export base. 
International exports account for a lower share of 
overall Scottish output than for the UK as a whole 
(20% vs. 27%). The EU and OECD average is 44% 
and 28% respectively. If Scotland was to export 
internationally the same share of its economy as 
the UK does, this would be equivalent to an extra 
£12 billion in Scottish exports.
Looking at the experience of similar sized nation 
states, we also find that Scotland depends more 
upon one market (i.e. rUK) than they do. 
Chart 5 compares Scotland with Denmark and 
Ireland  two countries that Scotland often seeks 
to emulate  both in terms of overall exports and 
the relative contribution of different markets. 
Broadening Scotlands export base  particularly 
to emerging markets  offers a significant growth 
opportunity. 
As always, the immediate outlook for Scottish 
growth will depend, in part, upon global oil prices. 
As indicated in our December commentary, the 
latest assessment of the industry undertaken 
as part of our oil and gas survey suggests that 
optimism is at its highest since 2013. 
Some of this reflects action taken to reduce costs, 
improve production efficiency and diversify to 
help support long-term sustainability. But it also 
reflects recent increases in oil prices. (Chart 6) 
The OBR now expect oil revenues to raise an 
additional £400m on average each year up to 
2022-23 compared to their November forecasts. 
Chart 4: Scottish exports by destination, 2002  2016
Source:  Scottish Export Statistics
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The UK economy
The UK economy has performed slightly better than 
expected during the 2nd half of 2017. (Chart 7)
Output rose by 0.4% between Oct-Dec, with 
business & financial services (up 0.9%) and 
manufacturing (up 1.3%) leading the way.
Construction output fell for the 3rd quarter in a row. 
Despite this somewhat better than expected 
performance, growth is now weaker than in many 
competitor countries. (Chart 8) 
Whilst some of this reflects temporary factors, 
there are concerns that the UK is entering a slower 
period of growth more generally. 
As we discuss below, the OBR remain relatively 
pessimistic about the outlook for UK productivity 
in the coming years. This is despite productivity 
having grown strongly  and above forecast  in 
recent months. 
But as Chart 9 highlights, this improvement stems, 
not from faster output growth, but a decline in 
hours worked. 
Weak productivity growth continues to feed 
through to low real earnings. Whilst nominal wages 
have picked up in recent months  rising 2.5% in 
Q4  they continue to lag behind inflation which 
remains above target at 3%. 
It is no surprise therefore that the parts of the 
economy tied to the fortunes of the consumer have 
been squeezed. (Chart 10)
Chart 7: UK quarterly and annual economic growth, Q1 2015  
Q4 2017
Source: ONS
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Chart 8: GDP growth in the UK and other G7 countries, Q1 2016 
 Q4 2017
Source: OBR
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Nevertheless, indicators of day-to-day economic 
activity remain relatively positive.  
The UK PMIs for services, manufacturing and 
construction, all continue to show UK businesses 
reporting relatively robust growth. (Chart 11)
In February, the Bank of Englands team of 
agents found that both utilisation of machinery 
and recruitment difficulties (an indicator of high 
demand) were above their historical average.  
Such evidence has led the OBR to conclude that 
the UK economy is operating at close to capacity. 
(Chart 12)
With this in mind  and with inflation still well 
above target  it is no surprise that speculation 
over further increases in interest rates have 
intensified. (Chart 13) 
Despite this, there remains a heightened degree of 
nervousness about the outlook for the UK economy, 
particularly given ongoing Brexit uncertainty.  
Indicators of sentiment within the business 
community remain skewed toward the downside. 
For example, a study by Deloitte of prospects as 
perceived by Chief Financial Officers, suggests a 
net balance are now relatively pessimistic about 
the outlook compared to just three months ago. 
(Chart 14) 
Chart 12: Range of output gap model estimates, Q1 2008  Q4 
2017
Source: OBR
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
O
u
tp
u
t 
g
a
p
 m
o
d
e
l 
e
s
ti
m
a
te
s
 (
%
)
Low Range of estimates OBR estimate
Source: OBR
Chart 13: Bank rate forecasts, Q1 2007  Q1 2023
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Chart 14: Perception of prospects compared to 3 months ago  
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Source: Deloitte
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It is against this backdrop that the Office for Budget 
Responsibility published their latest forecasts on 
13th March.  
Back in November, the OBR significantly revised 
down their UK economic forecasts for the next few 
years citing a weak outlook for productivity growth. 
In the end, growth in 2017 has turned out to be 
slightly better than the OBR had expected  1.7% 
vs. 1.5%. This has also led them to revise up their 
forecasts for 2018. 
But these revisions in the early years of their 
forecast horizon are mirrored by slight declines in 
later years  effectively reassessing where the UK 
is in the economic cycle.
Moreover, the outlook remains much more 
pessimistic than the forecasts from just two years 
ago. Growth is forecast to be less than 1.5% per 
annum from next year right up to 2022 (Chart 15). 
The key driver of this outlook is not Brexit, but 
weak forecasts for productivity. (Chart 16) 
Unsurprisingly, with productivity crucial for wage 
growth, the date at which real earnings will return 
to their pre-financial crisis peak has been pushed 
even further back. (Chart 17)
And whilst the Chancellor has been able to welcome 
the fact that the UK Government is  after nearly 10 
years of cuts  now only borrowing to invest, the 
public finances remain much weaker than George 
Osborne had planned for in his last Budget in 
March 2016. (Chart 18) 
Chart 16: Successive OBR forecasts for productivity growth, 
1999  2023
Source: OBR
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Chart 15: Changes in OBR forecasts of real GDP growth, 2017  
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Recent Scottish economic data
The latest figures for Scottish GDP cover the period 
to Q3 2017  and showed growth of just 0.2% over 
the 3-month period. 
Annual growth is currently 0.6%. To put that in 
context, growth had been averaging between 2 to 
2½% per year in the decade prior to the financial 
crisis. 
In the most recent quarter, production grew 1.2% 
whilst services grew 0.2%. Construction fell once 
more, down nearly 3% (and by 7.5% over the year). 
One interesting feature of the latest statistics were 
the revisions to past data releases. 
As Chart 20 highlights, statisticians have revised 
down their assessment of how Scottish GDP per 
head has tracked over the past few years. 
The new figures estimate that since 2015  despite 
overall Scottish GDP growing 1.1%  GDP per head 
has actually fallen by 0.1%. Over the same period, 
UK GDP per head grew nearly 3%. (Chart 21)
What explains this weak performance? 
Following the fall in the oil price, sectors tied 
to the North Sea supply chain  most notably 
manufacturing  had entered a sharp recession. 
However, we have started to see some encouraging 
signs in these sectors. Manufacturing rose 0.4% 
this quarter and by 2.9% over the year. (Table 4)
So the weak figures in recent times cannot be 
explained just by oil and gas. 
Chart 19: Q3 2017 GDP  contributions by sector
Source: Scottish Government
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Chart 20: Revisions to GDP  Q3 2017 publication vs Q2 2017 
publication
Source: Scottish Government
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Table 4: Growth in manufacturing, Q3 2017 on Q3 2016
Source: Scottish Government
Manufacturing industries Growth over last 12 months
Food & drink -2.9
Textiles -0.4
Petroleum/pharma 7.2
Metals & machinery 6.8
Computers etc. 1.7
Transport 4.7
Other 5.6
Total manufacturing 2.9
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The biggest drag on growth in 2017 has been 
construction  which has fallen for 7 consecutive 
quarters. (Chart 22)
As we have discussed before, the Scottish 
construction series has been displaying some odd 
characteristics in recent times.
There was strong growth during 2014 and early 
2015 with construction output up 30%. Since then, 
the series has fallen sharply as it returns to more 
normal levels. (Chart 23)
The Scottish Government believe that this is the 
result of a number of infrastructure projects being 
completed. But with capital budgets rising through 
2017, this cannot fully explain recent trends. 
Whatever the explanation  methodological or real 
 the volatility in the construction series has a 
significant impact on aggregate Scottish GDP.
In Chart 24, we strip out construction activity from 
the headline GDP series.
Firstly, growth in 2014 and 2015 is lower than 
reported. 
Secondly, and perhaps of most interest, the recent 
performance of the Scottish economy has not been 
as bad as the headline figures suggest. Indeed, 
growth in Scotland would be much closer to trend. 
The latest ONS figures for construction activity 
suggest that the Q4 will continue to see a decline 
once more. The Scottish Government should do 
more to unpick this data to understand better the 
reason for these swings in construction output.
The Scottish National Accounts data provides a 
useful breakdown of changes in the expenditure 
components of our economy over time. (Chart 25) 
The most recent figures show that, alongside 
household spending, net exports (both to RUK and 
ROW) have made the greatest positive contribution 
to Scottish growth in 2017. 
The same data however, also shows a sharp fall in 
business investment  down 15% over the year. 
Source: Scottish Government
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Chart 22: Indexed sector changes since 2015, Q1 2015 = 100
Source: Scottish Government
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Chart 23: Construction sector performance in Scotland since 
2012, index and quarterly change
Source: Scottish Government
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
 c
h
a
n
g
e
In
d
e
x 
Q
1
 2
0
1
2
 =
 1
0
0
Quarterly growth in construction (RHS)
Construction output (LHS)
Chart 24: Scottish GDP since sharp rise in construction in 2014 
 aggregate GDP with and without construction sector series
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Is this a Brexit effect? 
Possibly. But falling investment has been a feature 
of the Scottish economy for years. (Chart 26)
And Scotland is not alone.   
Total investment in the UK by business, government 
and households (i.e. Gross Fixed Capital Formation) 
lags behind our key competitors. (Chart 27)
This impacts upon a number of economic outcomes. 
For example, whilst business R&D has risen in 
recent years, Scotland still ranks only 9th in the UK 
in terms of R&D spend per head. (Chart 28)
The Scottish Governments National Investment 
Bank is the latest initiative to try to tackle this. 
Whilst welcome, we should be wary of expecting 
too much from the new institution early on.  
Clearly there can be a role for a state led investment 
vehicle  to plug gaps in the market and to support 
patient capital  but it needs to be matched by 
demand. Past initiatives, like the Scottish Growth 
Fund, have struggled to find companies in Scotland 
willing to put forward proposals for investment. 
And even if this is the case, the planned 
capitalisation of £350 million over two years is 
modest. Although, if successful it should leverage 
in further monies. 
One quick-win for the new Bank should be the 
creation of a single gateway through which firms 
can access funds and receive joined up advice on 
finance options. 
Chart 25: Expenditure components of nominal GDP, Q1 2014  
Q3 2017
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 26: Scottish business investment as a share of GDP, 1998 
 2016
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 27: G8 Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP, Q1 2005  Q2 2017
Source: ONS
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Chart 28: Business research & development real expenditure in 
Scotland, 2001  2016
Source: Scottish Government
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Trends in consumer spending in Scotland
In previous commentaries we have discussed the 
challenges faced by the retail sector. 
These can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, the trend in Scotland  as in other parts of 
the UK  has been for faster growth in spending on 
items like health and education than on traditional 
retailers. (Chart 29)
Secondly, we have seen a significant rise in online 
sales  which has changed both the way we shop 
and the profitability of many retail outlets.  
Overall, it would appear that these trends have had 
a greater impact on smaller retailers as opposed to 
larger stores. (Chart 30) 
In a related development, last month the ONS 
published updated figures on relative price levels 
across the UK. 
The results found that Scotland  alongside the 
SE, the SW and London  has an overall price level 
higher than the UK average.  
Very simply, this means that every £1 someone 
earns in Scotland, on average, purchases fewer 
goods and services than it would if they spent that 
same £1 in Wales (for example). 
Table 5 shows the breakdown of spend by activity 
as per the ONS study. A number of interesting points 
emerge including the fact that Scottish households 
spend a larger share of their expenditure on 
transport than elsewhere, including London. 
Chart 29: Household final consumption growth by expenditure, 
1999  2016
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 30: Indexed Scottish retail sales volume by size of 
company, Q1 2008 = 100
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 31: Price level index in different parts of the UK, UK 2016 
= 100
Source: ONS
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Table 5: Household budget shares of different goods/ services, 
2016
Source: ONS
Division London
England ex. 
London
Scotland
Food & non-alc drink 15.1 15.6 15.5
Alcohol & tobacco 2.3 3.2 4.0
Clothing & footwear 6.3 6.1 6.0
Housing & housing services 11.6 11 11.6
Furniture & household goods 10.1 9.2 8.6
Transport 19.4 21.6 22.3
Communication 4.2 4.1 3.9
Recreation & culture 10.0 10.4 10.2
Restaurants & hotels 17.1 14.8 14.1
Misc. goods & services 3.9 3.9 3.9
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The labour market
As we have written in past commentaries, 
Scotlands labour market has held up relatively 
well despite a challenging growth environment. 
Unemployment  at 4.3%  remains low by 
historical standards and there are 9,000 fewer 
people unemployed than this time last year. (Chart 
32)
This is a trend evident across the UK, and Scotland 
remains in the middle in terms of its UK rank by 
unemployment. (Chart 33)
The most recent data shows something of a 
fall-back, however, in outcomes. Employment 
fell by 8,000 whilst unemployment rose by 5,000 
during the 3 months Nov-Jan.
It is possible that this represents some early signs 
of Scotlands weak growth performance starting to 
feed through to the labour market. 
But given the volatility in the data, it is too early to 
judge with confidence  at this stage  if this is a 
blip or the start of a trend. 
As we have discussed in our companion report  
Scottish Labour Market Trends  our labour market 
continues to change markedly over a longer time 
horizon. 
Whilst there 86,000 more people in employment 
now than a decade ago, 52% of that increase 
has been in self-employment. How much of this 
reflects a positive choice or a response to less 
secure employment opportunities is still unclear. 
Chart 32: Scottish employment & unemployment rate, 2012  
2018
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 34: Scottish employment & self-employment, 2012  
2018
Source: ONS,LFS
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Chart 33: Unemployment rate in different regions and devolved 
nations in the UK, November 2017  January 2018
Source: ONS, LFS
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Chart 35: Employment rates by age, 2008  2017
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey
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Similarly, our labour market is ageing quite 
markedly.
One reason  perhaps  why the growth in the 
number of people in work has eased off in recent 
times has been because the amount of hours being 
worked by people already in employment has been 
rising. (Chart 36) 
Rising employment and/or rising hours worked has 
meant that productivity in Scotland has continued 
to be squeezed. 
Labour productivity  output per hour  fell by 
0.7% during the 3 months Jul-Sep 2017. (Chart 37)
This was the 8th quarter in a row of falling 
productivity. On this measure, Scottish productivity 
is back at 2010 levels. 
Why is this the case?
Labour productivity measures how well output is 
performing relative to changes in how much labour 
is being used to produce that output. 
If we are able to produce more for the same number 
of hours worked then we are more productive. On 
the other hand, if we are working longer but not 
producing much more, then our productivity has 
fallen. 
Chart 38 compares growth in the economy with the 
growth (inverted) in hours worked. It shows that 
the growth in hours has significantly outpaced 
that in the overall economy in recent times. 
So in other words, the strong labour market results 
observed in recent times has come at the expense 
of falling productivity. 
In a recent blog (www.fraserofallander.org) we 
argued that government targets for productivity 
have become increasingly irrelevant. Back in 2007, 
the target was for Scotland to be in the top OECD 
quartile by 2017. As at 2016, Scotland remains in 
the third quartile. (Chart 39)
Chart 36: Average hours worked and full-time share of 
employment, indexed to pre-recession average, 07/08  16/17
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey
Chart 37: Labour productivity in Scotland since 2015
Source: Scottish Government
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Chart 38: Changes in hours worked and output in Scotland since 
Q1 2016
Source: Scottish Government
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Policy discussions have tended to focus upon how 
best to generate high value productivity jobs and 
investment  i.e. in firms at the cutting edge of 
innovation and technology. 
But increasingly, policymakers at both the UK 
and Scottish level are realising the importance of 
boosting productivity across the economy more 
generally. 
As Chart 40 highlights, taking Glasgow and 
Edinburgh as an example, we see that vast majority 
of firms in the economy are in the middle to low 
end of the productivity spectrum. There are far 
fewer firms in the high-end of the spectrum. 
Finding ways to shift the entire distribution up 
the value chain will be crucial. A focus on better 
management, skills across the workforce, process 
and workforce innovation, fair work and adoption 
of technology will be key. 
Current economic conditions
The most up to date economic data for Scotland 
has remained relatively mixed. 
On the one hand, the FAI-RBS Business Monitor for 
Q4 2017 showed an increase in the net balance of 
firms reporting a rise in new and repeat business. 
(Chart 41) 
Indeed, the figures for new business are the 
highest since 2015. 
Chart 39: International productivity levels 2016 (USA = 100)
Source: Scottish Government
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The latest Scottish Chambers of Commerce 
Quarterly indicators have also been positive with 
most sectors  with the exception of tourism  
reporting an upturn. Some slippage in the tourism 
sector was not unexpected given the strong 
performance in early 2017.  
In contrast, the latest PMI indicator points to 
a more negative outlook. The indicator (where 
above 50 marks an expansion and below 50 a 
contraction) fell to 49.5  the 2nd time in 3 months 
that this measure has shown private sector activity 
declining. Scotland once again lags behind other 
parts of the UK. (Chart 43) 
As highlighted above, low levels of business 
investment has been a feature of recent times.  
The latest Scottish Business Monitor shows that 
capital investment intentions of Scottish firms 
have remained negative throughout 2017. 
Export intentions have, however, become much 
more buoyant no doubt fuelled by the ongoing 
competitive value of Sterling.  (Chart 45)
Overall, levels of consumer confidence remain 
weak. 
The GfK consumer confidence indicator for Scotland 
was -13 in February and remains well below the UK 
(Chart 46). 
A similar story emerges in the Scottish 
Governments consumer sentiment measure. 
(Chart 47)
Source: Lloyds PMI
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Chart 43: Scottish PMI continues to lag other parts of the UK
Source: FAI/RBS Business Monitor
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Chart 45: Index of manufacturing exports, Q1 2013 = 100
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Chart 46: Consumer confidence remains negative and worse 
than for the UK as a whole (>0 = more optimistic)
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Some of this concern appears to stem from the rise 
in inflation over the past year.
Most surveys continue to point to households 
citing rising costs, particularly on food and fuel, as 
a key drag on spending. (Chart 48)
Although inflation is likely to remain elevated for 
some time yet, it should start to fall back as the 
spike in import prices caused by the sharp fall in 
Sterling continues to dissipate. This should help 
ease the pressure on households and help to 
restore confidence. 
Like the wider economy, house prices have been 
growing in Scotland but at a relatively slow pace. 
Prices are up 2.6% over the past year. (Chart 49) 
Despite these challenging conditions for 
households, the demand for labour remains 
strong. (Chart 50) 
The Bank of Scotlands labour market barometer 
 which captures various measures of activity in 
the Scottish jobs market such as demand for new 
staff etc.  continues to perform well above its 
long-term average and to track the UK. 
This suggests that the apparent disconnect 
between a resilient labour market and a weaker 
economic outlook is likely to continue for some 
time yet.
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Chart 47: Consumer sentiment in Scotland, Q2 2013  Q4 2017
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 48: Household expectations for prices over the next 12 
months
Source: GfK
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Chart 49: Index and annual change in Scottish house prices, 
2015 Q1 = 100
Source: Nationwide
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Chart 50: Bank of Scotland employment indicator  continues to 
show robust labour market demand
Source: IHS Markit/ Bank of Scotland
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Scottish Fiscal Commission forecasts
Before our own forecasts, it is worthwhile 
reflecting on the projections of the new Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC).
As is now well known, the SFC are predicting 
a weaker outlook for Scotland than most other 
forecasters. (Chart 51) On their projections, growth 
will not rise above 1% per year until 2022.  
If this forecast turns out to be correct, this will be 
weakest run of growth in 60 years. 
Why are the SFC more pessimistic?
Firstly, they estimate that  despite recent weak 
growth   the economy is currently operating at 
close to capacity. 
Secondly, like the OBR, they believe that the 
slowdown in productivity of the last few years will 
continue for the foreseeable future. (Chart 52)
Thirdly, they use projections for population 
that predict a decline in Scotlands working age 
population over the next decade. (Chart 53) 
This means that whilst there is a gap in GDP per 
head between the SFC and OBR forecasts for the 
UK, it is much narrower than for total GDP. (Chart 
54)
It is important to note however that the SFC are still 
predicting that Scottish growth will pick-up, and 
be broadly on a par with average growth rates over 
the past decade. 
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Chart 52: Contributions to SFC GDP growth forecast, 1993/94  
2022/23
Source: Scottish Fiscal Commission
Chart 53: Scottish and UK 16-64 and working age population 
projections, 2016  2023
Source: Scottish Fiscal Commission
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Chart 54: SFC December 2017 and OBR March 2018 forecasts 
comparisons, GDP and GDP per capita
Source: Scottish Fiscal Commission
Chart 51: Scotland and UK GDP growth forecasts, 2018  2022
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Chart 55 shows the evolution of our forecasts for 
2017.
How does this compare to the official data?
We will get data for the final quarter of 2017 early 
next month (April 2018). Our latest nowcasts 
predict growth of between 0.3% and 0.4% for the 
3-month period. (Table 6)
If the official statistics for Q4 come in close to this 
value (or even near to Scotlands long-term trend), 
this will mean that growth for 2017 as a whole will 
be around 0.7%. 
This will be below our expectations and will mark 
the 2nd year of less than 1% growth.  
In fact, the closure of the Brent oil pipeline in 
December could mean that the Q4 GDP figure for 
Scotland comes in even lower.
We believe however, that the official GDP statistics 
could be revised up in the future to make them 
more consistent with a healthier labour market and 
key business surveys. As discussed, we find the 
spike and then contraction in construction difficult 
to explain given other indicators for the sector. 
Turning to our forecasts for the next three years, as 
in the past, we report a central forecast but also 
uncertainty bands that set out a likely range within 
which we predict Scottish economic growth will lie.
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
economy could grow close to 2% this year, but 
our assessment is that the probability of that 
happening is lower than our central projection. 
Overall, our forecasts are unchanged to those from 
December. (Table 7 and Chart 56)
Our forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2018 followed 
by growth of 1.4% in 2019 and 2020. 
In short, we believe that the Scottish economy 
will grow this year, will quicken over the forecast 
horizon, but growth will remain below trend.
Our forecasts
Table 6: Nowcasts for Q4 2017 and Q1 2018 for Scotland
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Q4 2017 Q1 2018
Quarterly Growth 0.36% 0.34%
Annualised Growth 1.47% 1.38%
Chart 55: Evolution of FAI forecasts for 2017 (June 2016 to 
September 2017)
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Chart 56: Growth to remain below trend through forecast
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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* Actual data to Q3 2017, central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 2018  2020. Uncertainty 
bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts at different forecast horizons.
Table 7: FAI forecast Scottish Economic growth (%) 2018 to 2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.9
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.6
Services 1.1 1.3 1.4
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Weak earnings growth should mean that household 
spending  and the industries it supports (e.g. 
retail)  will continue to be under pressure, 
although this should start to ease as inflationary 
pressures fall back.  
Our forecasts assume some bounce-back in 
investment. With Brexit uncertainty this is arguably 
the element of our forecast with the greatest risk.
Net exports and tourism are on track to continue to 
benefit from the low value of Sterling.  
We expect unemployment to rise slightly toward a 
level consistent with more medium-term trends. So 
any reported rise in unemployment in the coming 
months should pose little concern.
Of course, there remains uncertainty about any 
forecasts at the current time. 
On balance, our forecasts are more optimistic than 
those of the Scottish Fiscal Commission. 
Our reading of the labour market data  and 
in particular the indicators below the headline 
employment and unemployment statistics  
suggests that there is a degree of spare capacity 
in the Scottish economy that could help support 
growth if demand picks-up. 
We are also slightly more optimistic on the outlook 
for productivity. Finally, we take the view that 
whilst Scotlands 16-64 population may decline, a 
combination of in-migration from the rest of the UK 
and an increase in those working into retirement 
age will help to mitigate that somewhat in the 
short-term. 
While the growth gap between Scotland and the 
UK is likely to remain over the next couple of years, 
we expect it to narrow. 
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Chart 58: Contribution to FAI forecast 2018 to 2020: household 
contribution to fall back
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 57: Sector components of FAI growth forecasts for 2018 to 
2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Table 8: Forecast UK GDP growth (%) 2018 to 2020 
Source: HM Treasury
2018 2019 2020
Bank of England 1.7 1.8 1.7
OBR 1.5 1.3 1.3
NIESR 1.9 1.9 1.7
European Commission 1.4 1.1 n/a
IMF 1.5 1.6 1.7
ITEM Club 1.7 1.7 1.9
Table 9: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
2018 2019 2020
Employee jobs 2,461,900 2,487,350 2,529,350
% employee job growth 
over year
+0.9% +1.0% +1.7%
ILO unemployment 121,400 116,200 113,250
Bank of England - UK 
unemployment rate (%)
4.3 4.2 4.1
OBR - UK unemployment 
rate (%)
4.4 4.5 4.6
Fraser of Allander 
Institute - Scottish 
unemployment rate (%)1
4.5 4.3 4.1
Notes:
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.
1. Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of economically active population 
aged 16 and over.
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2018 will be an important year for the Scottish 
economy. 
As the analysis earlier highlights, early indications 
are that 2018 will be another year of relatively 
muted growth. 
Opportunities
But Scotland retains clear economic strengths. 
Therefore, the recovery in the global economy, 
coupled with the long-term growth potential of 
emerging markets, offers significant opportunities 
for Scottish exporters to expand into new markets 
and increase their presence in existing ones. 
The exponential growth in technology also provides 
the potential for new investment and innovation, 
particularly given Scotlands strong skills base and 
the research output of its universities. 
At the same time, developing sustainable and 
productive business models for sectors of our 
economy that will grow significantly in the years 
ahead  such as in health and social care  will 
provide major new employment opportunities. 
Of course, there are areas where Scotland can do 
better, for example in boosting levels of productivity 
across the economy as a whole. But even small 
improvements here, e.g. through increased rates 
of innovation in the workplace, has the potential to 
lead to major long-term benefits. 
Risks
Clearly Brexit remains the greatest likely headwind 
for the Scottish economy. 
The long-term risks are well known. 
Over 40% of Scotlands international exports are 
to the EU and many of our firms operate in supply 
chains which rely upon the flow of goods and 
services across borders. 
At the same time, with Scotlands working age 
population projected to fall over the next decade, 
any loss of EU migrants could have serious 
implications for individual sectors and the public 
finances. On top of this, no-one yet knows the 
impact on domestic and international investment, 
productivity or the UKs status in the global 
economy. 
As the table below highlights, the estimates in 
the UK Governments impact analyses are broadly 
in line with both our own analysis and that of the 
Scottish Government.
Table 10: Change in Scottish GDP relative to baseline of full EU 
membership by 2030
EEA FTA WTO
UK (2018)* -2.5% -6.0% -9.0%
SG (2018) -2.7% -6.1% -8.5%
FAI (2018) NA -4.9% -7.5%
* internal results as reported by media.            Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
In recent days, important progress appears to have 
been made with regard to the transition period the 
UK and the EU will operate within up to December 
2020.
Whilst this creates space for further discussion, 
most of the major economic issues with respect 
to the UKs relationship with the EU post-Brexit 
remain unanswered. 
It is understandable that exact details of the UK-EU 
settlement cannot be set out until a final agreement 
is reached. However, in 2018 businesses will look 
for much greater evidence that the UK Government 
has a clear vision for life outside the EU that not 
only satisfies business but can also secure the 
necessary parliamentary support. 
Finding a solution to the Irish border issue which 
reconciles with the basic economics of how a 
Customs Union works is just one example where 
clarity seems to be lacking. The process for the 
transfer of powers to the devolved nations is 
another.  
But like it or not, Brexit is happening. 
So the sooner that businesses prepare for this 
reality the better. 
According to a recent CBI survey published in 
January of this year, over 40% of UK businesses 
have yet to do any scenario planning for Brexit. 
Policy context
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President Eisenhowers famous quote  In 
preparing for battle I have always found that plans 
are useless, but planning is indispensable  has 
arguably never been more appropriate. 
No-one knows with certainty the outcome of the 
negotiations. What will our trading relationship 
with the EU be; will there be tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers or a customs border to navigate; how 
closely aligned will UK regulations be with the EU; 
and how accessible will EU wide resources be? 
But the process of working through the potential 
implications of different scenarios on business 
models, supply chains, access to markets and 
sources of funding will be invaluable.
Effective preparations will ensure that  whatever 
the outcome  firms will be able to make the best 
of the new business environment. 
In the same vein, there is arguably much more that 
both the Scottish and UK Governments could do to 
help Scottish businesses understand and prepare 
for Brexit. Providing this support should not be 
viewed as somehow inconsistent with Ministers 
different political standpoints. 
As Chart 59 highlights, the lack of information is a 
key concern for many firms. 
Chart 59: Of firms that have done scenario planning, what are 
the main difficulties faced?
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Source: CBI
Economic policy in Scotland
In recent commentaries, we have argued that 
there is an opportunity to use the challenge posed 
by Brexit to undertake a fundamental review of 
economic policy in Scotland.
The Scottish Government has started to set out 
its emerging thinking, with the creation of the new 
Strategic Board for Enterprise and Skills and new 
initiatives, such as an implementation plan for a 
new Scottish Investment Bank.  
But if Brexit is going to make the economic outlook 
even more challenging than it was already, 
government policy is going to need even sharper 
focus. This means targeting resources where they 
will have the greatest impact and stopping doing 
things that either do not work or do not provide 
value for money. 
Central to this is an effective strategy and delivery 
programme. 
When first coming to power in 2007, the Scottish 
Government had one objective  a Purpose of 
delivering faster sustainable economic growth 
supported by an overarching Economic Strategy. 
This Purpose was supported by a transparent 
National Performance Framework that was 
designed to monitor progress. All parts of the 
public sector were to be aligned behind this 
Purpose and single Economic Strategy. 
The Strategy explicitly stated that the call to 
action for all arms of the public sector to support 
increasing sustainable growth is not an invitation 
for a proliferation of initiatives, however well 
intentioned that all interventions would be 
appraised on the basis of sound analysis and 
evidence and that more effective government 
would assist in reducing duplication, bureaucracy 
and overlap across the public sector in pursuit of 
greater efficiency, effectiveness and, importantly, 
speed of delivery.
10 years later  in our view  this clarity of focus 
has arguably been lost.  
Here is a snapshot of the current landscape. 
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Across the Scottish Government and its agencies, 
we now have an Economic Strategy; Digital 
Strategy; Energy Strategy; Circular Economy 
Strategy; Climate Change Plan; Trade and 
Investment Strategy; Labour Market Strategy; 
Social Enterprise Strategy; Hydro Nation Strategy; 
Strategy Action Plan for Women in Enterprise; 
STEM Strategy; Manufacturing Action Plan; Youth 
Employment Strategy; an Innovation Action Plan; 
a National Islands Plan; an Agenda for Cities; and 
even an Arctic Strategy.
Sitting alongside these we have numerous sector 
specific strategies  including Food and Drink; 
Tourism; Textiles; and Life Sciences. Not to mention 
an Infrastructure Investment Plan and an annual 
budget and programme for government process. 
On top of this, most local authorities have their 
own form of economic development plan; all major 
sectors have a skills investment plan; there will 
soon be 7 City Deals; a new regional inclusive 
growth hub; and an updated National Performance 
Framework.  
All of this overseen by the Scottish Government; 
Scottish Enterprise; Skills Development Scotland; 
Scottish Funding Council; Visit Scotland; Highlands 
and Islands Enterprise; South of Scotland 
Enterprise Agency; Scottish Futures Trust; Scottish 
National Investment Bank; and thirty two local 
authorities. 
In turn they are informed by numerous advisory 
boards including the Council of Economic Advisers; 
Strategic Board for Enterprise and Skills; five 
independent boards of Scotlands enterprise and 
skills agencies; National Economic Forum;  Scottish 
Leaders Forum; Scottish Business Growth Group; 
Strategic Labour Market Group; Consumers and 
Markets Taskforce; Hydro Nation Forum; Inward 
Investment Forum; Regulatory Review Group; 
Scotland CAN DO Innovation Forum; Fair Work 
Convention; Advisory Panel on the Collaborative 
Economy; and numerous industry groups  such 
as the Scottish Tourism Alliance and the Financial 
Services Advisory Board.
Of course, this list does not include the various 
programmes and activities of the UK Government 
in Scotland. 
All of these initiatives are well intentioned. But is 
such a structure the best way to support coherent 
policy intervention in a country of Scotlands size? 
More importantly, where is the evidence that this 
complex structure has had  or will have  a positive 
impact on Scotlands economic performance or 
deliver the systems-wide reforms required to help 
meet Scotlands long-term economic challenges?  
Whilst many will undoubtedly have improved 
Scotlands economic performance, do we know 
which ones? 
What evidence underpins each initiative and what 
systems for monitoring, evaluation and feedback 
are in place to assess their success (or otherwise)? 
Strategies and advisory groups are no substitute 
for good policy delivery based upon evidence and 
data. 
Back in 2007, the Scottish Government promised a 
streamlined and effective policy landscape for the 
economy. Ten years later it may be time to look at 
this again. 
Rediscovering a single unified vision for the 
economy where all policies are aligned might just 
be the most significant  and effective  step the 
Scottish Government could take in 2018.  
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